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Muhammad al-Jâbrî, al-Dîn wa-l-dawla wa tatbîq al-sharî'a, Beirut : Markaz dirasât al-wad'
al-'arabî, 1996
1 In the past two decades the movement of « political Islam » – also labeled « resurgence »,
« revival », or « renewal » of Islam – has dominated the agenda of most Muslim countries.
The call for the implementation of sharî'a law is one of the tenets of this movement This
tenet, however, suffered from two shortcomings. First, the call for the sharî'a turned out
to be more a battle cry than a clear program.1Many Muslims will agree that the sharî'a 
should be applicable to their daily life, but few will be able to indicate what this means or
how this should actually be executed. Second, the discussion has been polarized : it was a
« yes » (full implementation of sharî’a law) versus a « no » (no implementation of sharî’a 
law).  Moreover,  the protagonists of  sharî'a  law advocated a revival  of  sharî’a  law, the
restoration of the sharî’a to its old glory. In this clash between supporters and opponents
of sharî'a law, the moderates who tried to take an inbetween position were either unheard
or ostracized. It seems, however, that these moderates are slowly but surely emerging.
They are Muslims who support the implementation of the sharî’a, but who are in favor of
an  evolutionary  rather  than  a  revolutionary  process.  In  addition,  they  have  specific
conceptions  on  what  should be  meant  by  sharî'a  and  to  what  extent  and  by  which
methodologies it should be implemented. Between the two extremes of the « yes » and
Review Essay : Three Recent Views on the Implementation of Islamic Law
Égypte/Monde arabe, 34 | 2008
1
the « no », these people have taken the middle position of the « yes, but » : Yes, sharî’a 
should be implemented, but on certain conditions.2
2 In this review essay, aselection is made among these moderates based on three books
published in 1996. The authors are the Egyptian former Court of Appeal and High Court of
Security judge Sa'îd al-'Ashmâwî, the Egyptian State Council member Târiq al-Bishrî, and
the Moroccan philosopher Muhammad al-Jâbrî. These books are interesting for various
reasons. First, their authors do not blindly take a « yes » or « no » position, but break new
ground for further developments of the sharî'a. Second, it appears that they endeavor to
reach a larger audience by abandoning the complex intellectual discourse so common
among Arab intellectuals  and choosing to write small  books in a simple and distinct
Islamic prose.
 
Sharî'a and Ijtihâd
3 Before entering into the discussion of these books, some terminology which plays a key
role in the arguments of their authors needs to be addressed.
4 According to orthodox Islamic dogma, the sharî'a is the code of conduct of the Muslim. Its
written sources are the Koran (which is the word of God) and the Sunna (the collection of
hadîth, which are the actions and sayings of the prophet Muhammad). From a legal point
of view, this corpus of the sharî'a contains very few rules. Less than one percent of the
Koran,  for  instance,  can  be  considered legal  rules,  mostly  dealing  with  family  and
inheritance law.
5 In the first four centuries of Islam, many legal scholars developed new legal rules and
principles,  based ideally on the two principle sources,  the Koran and the Sunna. The
scholarship of deriving these additional rules and principles is called the fiqh, which was
also the term used for the extensive corpus in which they were collected.
6 The individual scholar who, through certain methodologies, derives rules from the two
principle sources, is said to practice ijtihâd. According to orthodox Islamic dogma, this
practice was stopped after four centuries (i.e. in the 4th century AH/10th century AD). It
was said that « the gates of ijtihâd are closed ». One of the reasons for the prohibition of
further ijtihâd was that four centuries of legal activity had provided enough rules, and no
new rules were needed.
7 The main feature of the closing of the gates of ijtihâd is the cessation of direct access to
the two principle sources, and complete reliance on the corpus of fiqh. Within the fiqh, 
however, new rules were allowed to develop, but technically speaking, however, this was
not proper ijtihâd. From this period onward, one had to refer to the fiqh to know sharî'a 
rules. It is therefore not surprising that the terms fiqh and sharî'a are often interchanged.
Two developments in the history of sharî'a ate of importance for this review essay : the
reopening of the gates of ijtihâd and the reintroduction of the sharî'a. Although modern
scholars have reason to believe that the gates of ijtihâd were never really closed, 3the
possibility  of  reopening  these  gates  has  been  a  much  debated  issue  among  Muslim
scholars  since  the  19th  century.  Orthodox  Islamic  dogma,  however,  has  so  far  not
acknowledged the renewed activity of ijtihâd'with regard to the Koran and the Sunna. In
Egypt, this has been recently confirmed by the Supreme Constitutional Court in March
19944and in August 1996 by the Court of Cassation in the infamous Nasr Abu Zayd case.5
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8 In the 20th century, the debate on reopening the gates of ijtihâd became overshadowed by
the debate  on reintroducing sharî'a  law.  In most  new Muslim nation-states,  much of
sharî'a law was replaced by western laws and legal systems, and reintroducing sharî'a law
became a political issue.
 
Three Views
9 The following paragraphs will present the three authors' arguments, beginning with a
brief overview of the history of sharî'a law. It will become apparent that the three authors
view their past in completely different ways which, in turn, have a definite influence on
how they see the future. Finally, a discussion of the main issue ensues : How to implement
sharî’a law ?
 
The Developments of Sharî'a Law in the Past
10 Both Bishrî  and 'Ashmâwî argue that sharî’a  law has been in decline in the past  few
centuries ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 8-9 ; Bishrî, 1996 : 7). Their views on how this deterioration
was halted, however, lead to diametrically opposed positions. According to 'Ashmâwî, it
was western legal concepts that put the sharî’a back on track again and saved it from
further decline ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 8-9).
11 Bishrî,  on the  other  hand,  argues  that  western concepts  –  and western influence  in
general – are the root of its decline. He argues that the much needed restoration of sharî’a
was already undertaken by Muslim scholars themselves, by the so-called « renewal » (tajdî
d) movement of the 18th and 19th centuries (Bishrî, 1996 : 8-12, 110 ff.). These scholars
were  debating  the  reopening  of  the  gates  of  ijtihâd.  These  activities  were  radically
interrupted  by  what  Bishrî  calls  the  European  « aggression »  (ghazwa).  Instead  of
concentrating  on  restructuring  Muslim  society  and  its  legal  system,  the  renewal
movement  became  submerged  in  an  identity  struggle  and  resistance  against
westernization. The basis of Bishrî's argument is that the initial activity of the renewal
movement should be picked up again and continued.
12 Jâbrî sees the developments of sharî’a law from another perspective. According to him,
the present situation of social turmoil and the call for implementation of sharî’a law is just
the natural course of Islamic history. Early Islamic society was a coherent social order, he
explains, without external influences. The only unrest this young society had to deal with
was its search for a unified doctrine of its new religion. The fundamentalist groups and
movements that were causing havoc at that time were in disagreement on the doctrine of
Islam (‘aqîda), and not the application of the sharî’a. Issues were the essence of God, His
attributes,  divine justice,  free will,  the nature of  creation,  and so forth (Jâbrî,  1996 :
152-153). Today, Jâbrî claims, the opposite is the case. The religion of Islamic societies is
unified in orthodox Islam, but its social order is disrupted by foreign influences. Islamic
societies are forced to reevaluate and determine their own social order. This is a matter
of sharî’a.  Today's fundamentalist groups and movements do not disagree on religious
matters, but on the application of the sharî’a. Issues include the implementation ofIslamic
laws,  the  veil,  interest  on  money,  criminal  law  (Jâbrî,  1996 :  151-155).  From  these
historical developments, Jâbrî deduces an optimistic vision of the present situation : just
as religious groups and antagonists in the past found « modem » methods and notions to
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« reconstruct »  religious  dogma and theology,  so  will  the  fundamentalist  movements
vanish when the science of the sharî'a is « reconstructed » with modern methods and
notions (Jâbrî, 1996 : 156).
 
How Much Further ? What Is Needed Is Renewal, Not Revival
13 With regard to the present situation, the three authors are unanimous on a few points.
They claim that the call for implementation of sharî’a law has nothing to do with religion,
but is motivated by social, economic, and political factors ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 20 ; Bishrî,
1996 : 49,104 ; Jâbrî, 1996 : 129, 133). They also argue that present Islamic society faces
many problems, especially the lack of justice. They further agree that the solution to
these problems is the implementation of sharî’a law ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 10), provided it is
not being revived and restored in its former position, but applied in a renewed form
(Bishrî, 1996 : 49 ; Jâbrî, 1996 : 133). Here, the road between 'Ashmâwî on the one hand,
and Bishrî and Jâbrî on the other, starts to diverge.
 
'Ashmâwî : the Sharî'a Is Already Applied
14 As mentioned above, 'Ashmâwî claims that the implementation of western legal systems
and  concepts  has  saved  sharî’a  law  from  further  deterioration.  He  argues  that  this
implementation does not mean that sharî’a law has been substituted by western laws. On
the contrary, in Egypt, sharî’a law is actually already implemented, infused with western
concepts and laws which are not contradictory to sharî’a law. « Egyptian law is ninety
percent sharî’a law » ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 11).
15 'Ashmâwî reasons as  follows.  Since the sources of  sharî’a  law (the Koran and Sunna)
contain so few legal rules, implementation of sharî’a law actually means implementation
of fiqh ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 25-26). Only the iiqh provides the corpus and the framework for a
legal system that can be implemented. Within the fiqh, it is permitted by orthodox Islam
to adapt  rules  to  place and time.  It  is  therefore perfectly  admissible  and within the
scholarly tradition of the fiqh, 'Ashmâwî continues his argument, to use western concepts
and rules ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 22).
16 He  argues  also  that  western  influences  in  present  Egyptian  law  are  not  foreign  to
Egyptian society or sharî’a law. Most of Egyptian law is based on French law, which is
based on Roman law. Sharî’a law and Roman law, 'Ashmâwî argues, share the same legal
and cultural heritage, and there are quite a few influences of Roman law in sharî’a law
('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 31-35).
17 Finally, 'Ashmâwî states, the observation that sharî’a law is actually already implemented
in Egypt is not new. It was the conclusion reached in 1987 by the committee appointed by
the Egyptian government to review Egyptian law according to its Islamic value. According
to 'Ashmâwî, the committee's conclusion was again confirmed in 1995 by the famous TV-
preacher Sha'râwî and the shaykh al-Azhar, Gâd al-Haqq ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 11-12).
 
Jâbrî and Bishrî : Reopen the Gates of Ijtihâd
18 Jâbrî  and  Bishrî  continue  where  'Ashmâwî  leaves  off :  sharî'a  law  still  needs  to  be
implemented, albeit in a renewed form. Their concern is not so much with the actual
rules of sharî'a law, but its methodology. Both advocate the use of the legal theoretical
framework of the sharî’a, and both argue that it is necessary to regain direct access to the
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primal sources of the sharî’a in order to formulate new solutions. In other words, the
gates of ijtihâd should be reopened. But these gates are not merely to be opened ; the
ijtihâd advocated by Jâbrî and Bishrî needs to be a « renewed » ijtihâd.
19 Bishrî  emphasizes  that  sharî’a  rules  should  not  be  followed  blindly,  but  serve  as  an
inspiration,  a  divine blueprint  for  further legislation (Bishrî,  1996 :  124).  There is  no
unique way to implement sharî’a law, he says. There are different ways, depending on the
Islamic society where it is implemented, just as there are different implementations of
« democratic » and « socialisf systems in European countries (Bishrî, 1996 : 78).
20 According to Jâbrî, the « old » ijtihâd is no longer usable : « The [old] ijtihâd which has
been shaped by life is of no use to the present, and the past has no use for it anymore »
(Jâbrî,  1996 :  166).  The main problem of  the « old »  ijtihâd  is  that  it  tends  too much
towards a literal  interpretation of the rules of the Koran and Sunna. The changes in
« Muslim culture » demand a « renewal of its roots », i.e.  renewal « in-depth, but also
from  depth »  (fi  al-a'mâq  wa  min  al-a'mâq)  (Jâbrî,  1996 :  134).  He  advocates  a
« reconstruction » of the science of the sharî’a by means of a modern ijtihâd.
21 Jâbrî justifies this adaptation of the « old » ijtihâd within the context of the sharî’a. The
method  of  legal  reasoning  as  prescribed  by  the  « old »  ijtihâd  might  have  become
sacrosanct, he argues, but its principles are not prescribed by the Koran or Sunna. They
are man-made, developed by the legal scholars in the first centuries of Islam. This means
that « nothing prevents us from developing other legal methodologies, as long as they
realize the wisdom of the Legislation in a particular period in the best possible way »
(Jâbrî, 1996 : 179).
 
The Immutability of Sharî'a Rules
22 The relation between sharî'a and fiqh rules is the most delicate subject in the debate on
the implementation of sharî'a law. Bishrî and 'Ashmâwî are very explicit in separating the
sharî’a from the fiqh. The sharî’a has as sources the Koran and the Sunna. These rules are
untouchable. The fiqh, on the other hand, is man-made law and adapted to circumstances
of time and place ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 25 ; Bishrî, 1996 : 25-26,35-36,99-100).
23 Bishrî  takes  this  distinction  literally.  The  rules  of  the  Koran  and  Sunna  are  an
untouchable  blueprint  for  eternity  and  for  every  place.  They  are  « non-historic  and
superseding  time  and  place »,  and  they  are  « the  source  of  legal  and  institutional
legality » (masdaral-shar'iyya al-qânûniyya wa-l-nidhâmiyya) (Bishrî, 1996 : 91). The few rules
it contains, such as divorce, inheritance portions, hudûd, etc., are therefore immutable
(Bishrî, 1996 : 107). Legislative freedom only exists within the context of the fiqlr. « fiqh is
a positive, historical [corpus] :  we take from it and we leave it according to what we
perceive in the sources of Islam [i.e. Koran and Sunna] as modem, taking into account
that the fiqh is a historical expertise which needs to be studied ; it is the experiences
(tajârib) of the past from which we seek guidance. » (Bishrî, 1996 : 37) It is within this
context that Bishrî sees the necessity of practicing a renewed form of ijtihâd (Bishrî, 1996 :
102).
24 According  to  Bishrî,  implementation of  sharî’a  does  not.mean the  implementation of
certain rules, but« the return to the source of Islamic legality, to be sovereign, and the
standard measure of ruling, and the legislative source for human actions and institutions
as well as for values for behavior in accordance with ethics (akhlâq) (...). This does not
mean seeking laws and orders to replace those promulgated by the state, nor [does it
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mean] the call to set its laws aside. (...) The aim is a situation in between » (Bishrî, 1996 :
124).
25 'Ashmâwî takes a more liberal view with regard to the sharî’a. As demonstrated above,
'Ashmâwî argues that the call for the application of sharî’a is actually the call for the
application of the fiqh – ninety percent of which is implemented in Egypt. The sharî’a 
might come back into the picture with the remaining ten percent. In that case, 'Ashmâwî
argues,  sharî’a  rules  should not  be applied literally.  The sharî’a  is  not  only rules  and
principles  but  it  is  first  (...)  a  general  atmosphere  which  rules  the  community. »
('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 73) Sharî’a law should only be applied « within the framework that is
wished by the Great Legislator » ('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 91). With regard to the hudûd, the
criminal offences described in the Koran, for instance, he argues that they are limited by
the fiqh, and are only applicable in a community of believers. Society, therefore, should
first be changed in accordance with the spirit of islam before the hudûd are implemented
('Ashmâwî, 1996 : 72).
26 Jâbrî  takes  an even more liberal  view and advocates  a  complete  renewed approach :
« What is needed today is a renewal, not based on the continuation of ijtihâd in the furû » 
[i.e.  fiqh]  but  on  resourcing  the  sources  (i'âdat  ta'sîlal-usûl)  [i.e.  the  sharî'a]  and  on
reconstructing them »  (Jâbrî,  1996 :  157).  Like  'Ashmâwî,  Jâbrî  argues  that  when
practicing ijtihâd, one should focus on the meaning of the rules of the Koran and sharî’a 
rather than on the literal text. The legal reasoning should be inspired by the sharî’a in
order to « realize God's wisdom. » But Jâbrî continues his argument by. stating that the
general purpose of the sharî’a – or God's wisdom – is the common interest of a society
(maslaha) (Jâbrî, 1996 : 52-53, 164-165, 169-172). This legal concept was developed by the
Muslim scholar al-Shâtibî in the 8th century AH6and is vehemently rejected by Bishrî
(Bishrî, 1996 : 130).
27 In addition, Jâbrî advocates that sharî’a rules be seen in a historical and social context. He
gives the example of the hadd punishment of cutting off the thief s hand. This punishment
was justifiable in a Bedouin nomadic society which lived in harsh conditions, without
jails, police or central power. Today, Jâbrî argues, the social context has changed, and
although a thief still needs to be punished, modern means and institutions have made the
hadd punishment obsolete (Jâbrî, 1996 :175).
 
Conclusion
28 The call for implementation of the sharî’a is as old as Islam itself, and is not a whim of the
1970s and 1980s. The implementation of sharî’a does not exist. This review essay shows
that there are many possible views between the extreme position of full unconditional
implementation of the sharî’a and complete rejection of it.
29 The views of the three Muslim Arab authors discussed in this essay are interesting for a
number of reasons. They are the vanguard of Muslim « moderates » that dare to speak out
in the vicious battle between opponents and proponents of implementation of sharî’a law.
Their maxim is : Yes, the sharî’a should be applied, but on certain conditions. All three
agree that implementation should take place not by revolution, but by an evolutionary
process through legislation. Their main concern is that Islamic society benefits from this
implementation. Implementation, therefore, should take place in a new adopted form.
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The authors  also agree that  the necessary changes  in society cannot  come about  by
legislation alone, but need to come from within society.
30 The conditions by which sharî’a law should be implemented is also an issue of contention
between the authors. 'Ashmâwî argues that sharî’a law is in effect already implemented in
Egypt, since Egyptian law in most cases does not contradict sharî’a law. Jâbrî and Bishrî
argue that sharî’a law still needs to be implemented, and both advocate the reopening of
the doors of ijtihâd. But where Jâbrî advocatesa liberal interpretation of sharî'a rules based
on the common interest of the community,Bishrî takes the conservative view that sharî'a 
rules are not to be altered.
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